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Abstract 
What are the effects of female labor market integration on daycare spending in advanced capitalist 
countries, and what factors condition the effects? In their seminal book, Huber & Stephens (2001a) argue 
that the interaction between female labor force participation (FLFP) and strong leftist governments will 
result in more welfare spending – essentially because female labor market integration increases demand 
for caregiving services. Applying their model to daycare spending this article finds no evidence for the 
Huber&Stephens hypothesis. The article instead finds that female labor market integration will increase 
daycare spending, but only in economies with strong employer organizations and political systems with few 
constitutional constraints on state power. In political economies with fragmented and weak employer 
organizations and a political system with many constitutional constraints, the mobilization of women on 
the labor market does not seem to result in more daycare spending. As such, the organization of the 
political economy and the structure of the state is argued to be strong mediating factors of the effects of 
female labor market integration on daycare spending – and hence on early childhood education. The 
arguments are tested using an error correction specification on 17 advanced capitalist countries with data 
from 1980-2007. 
 
Keywords: Daycare spending, female labor market integration, female labor force participation, employer 
organization, constitutional structure, power resources, conditional effects, time-series cross-section, 
OECD-countries. 
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Introduction 
 
What role does female labor market integration play for changes in daycare spending in advanced capitalist 
countries? The feminist revolution has rightfully increased the attention paid to the role of women in 
comparative politics (Orloff, 1993, Sainsbury, 1996) and studies on women’s participation in the labor 
market is overwhelming (Becker, 1965; OECD, 1989; Grunow et al., 2012). However, the independent and 
conditional effects of female labor force participation on changes in daycare spending still remain 
unexplored. 
In their seminal book, Huber & Stephens (2001a) argue that the interaction between increased female 
labor force participation (FLFP) and left parties in government is important in understanding welfare state 
expansion in the industrialized countries after WW II. The authors argue that as more women enter the 
labor market, the demand for daycare spending and welfare policy in general rises. If the interest of 
working women is aligned with the left it will tend to result in increased spending on welfare policies, or so 
the authors argue. 
Applying this model to daycare spending, this article finds no evidence for Huber & Stephen’s hypothesis 
that the interaction between left parties and the integration of women into the labor market should lead to 
more spending on daycare. Instead, it is, contrary to their other wisely enlightening hypothesis, argued that 
increased female labor market participation will increase spending on daycare, but only in economies with 
strong employer organizations and political systems with few constraints on state power – i.e. few 
institutional veto points. Since employers in the so-called market economies, in general, depend more on 
high-quality skills to sustain a high equilibrium production mode relative to employers in the so-called 
liberal market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Martin & Swank, 2004), increasing female labor force 
participation will more likely result in more spending on daycare in countries with strong employer 
organizations. As such, it is argued that the organization of the political economy conditions the effects of 
FLFP on daycare spending.  
But it is not only women’s ability to ally with key actors that are key in understanding the conditional 
effects of FLFP on daycare spending: the political system also matters a great deal (Immergut, 1992). In 
countries with strong checks and balances on state power (such as presidential and federal systems), 
increased FLFP will less likely result in increased spending on daycare as policy proposal expanding social 
policy will get vetoed by the political system. Not so in systems with few institutional constraints on state 
power. Here the effects of FLFP will more likely result in higher spending on daycare spending as policies 
are less likely to be vetoed. The structure of the political system as well as employers’ organizations, 
therefore, seem to be strong mediating factors of the effects of FLFP on daycare spending. 
Aalborg University Working paper Etzerodt 
3 
 
As such, the paper provides two new empirical insights. First, there does not seem to be any interaction 
effects between left parties and FLFP on daycare spending. Second, increasing FLFP will result in more 
daycare spending, but only in economies with strong employer organizations and political systems with few 
constitutional veto points. 
In answering these questions, the article moreover tries to combine strands of literature that is yet to be 
married in explaining why some advanced capitalist countries increase spending on daycare relatively more 
than other. More specifically, I try to integrate female labor market integration with Varieties of Capitalism 
and the literature on constitutional structures in explaining changes in daycare spending across advanced 
capitalist countries. In doing so, I argue that the interaction between key actors (women and employers) as 
well as actors and political systems (women and constitutional structures) is important in understanding 
why the effects of FLFP on changes in daycare spending are different across advanced capitalist countries. 
The theoretical models are tested using time-series cross-section data on 17 advanced capitalist 
countries from 1980-2007 with an error correction specification. The article is structured as follows: a short 
overview of some of the literature on the effects of female labor force participation is first presented. 
Second, a theoretical framework based on Varieties of Capitalism and the literature on constitutional veto 
points is presented. A number of methodological considerations are then put forward followed by an 
interpretation of the empirical findings. The final part of the paper discusses the findings and concludes. 
 
Women and social policy 
 
Much of the literature on women and family is centered around inequalities between the sexes and how 
different policy regimes affects women's’ vís-a-vís men’s opportunities (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Huber & 
Stephens, 2000; Korpi et al. 2013). These questions are important, but this article takes a different 
perspective and sees women as an independent force shaping the welfare state. An important contribution 
to the effects of FLFP on the welfare state is Huber & Stephens (2001) eloquently written book “Crisis and 
Development of the Welfare State”. In the book, it is argued that as women enter the labor market demand 
for social policy increases. When stay-at-home-moms enter the labor market, parts of the caregiving 
responsibilities (i.e. children and the elderly) are moved out of the home (typically in daycare institutions 
and other caregiving institutions). As such more FLFP increases demand for more public spending on 
daycare spending. 
Increased demand for caregiving policies moreover creates a “positive feedback” process since demand 
for daycare spending also increases demand for female labor (Huber & Stephens, 2001: 47; see also Iversen 
& Rosenbluth, 2010). If working women moreover can ally with left parties it will, in general, result in a 
Aalborg University Working paper Etzerodt 
4 
 
bigger welfare state, according to Huber & Stephens (2001). Brady et al. (2005) however find no evidence in 
support of the thesis that the interaction between FLFP and left parties should result in a bigger welfare 
state writ large. It is therefore somewhat uncertain if the interaction between working women and left 
parties should result in a bigger welfare state. If it is not the case, what other factors (if any) condition the 
effects of FLFP on changes in daycare spending? Neither Huber & Stephens nor Brady et al. test the 
argument directly on daycare spending, although the raison d'etre of the theoretical argument relates more 
directly to daycare spending than welfare state spending in general. 
 At the micro level, Iversen & Rosenbluth (2006) moreover argue that working women have more 
positive preferences for social policy relative to stay-at-home moms. This is the case, as working women’s 
outside opportunities is strengthened when daycare spending, such as high-quality daycare institutions, are 
present. Also, as a large portion of women is employed in public sector jobs, working women will tend to 
support the welfare state relatively more to stay-at-home moms who are relatively less dependent on the 
welfare state and daycare spending in general. Both micro level and macro level arguments can, therefore, 
help shed light on the study of daycare spending. 
 
Women, employer organizations and constitutional structures 
 
The theoretical model builds on insights from Varieties of Capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001) and the 
literature on constitutional structures (Immergut, 1992; Huber et al., 1993). Based on these two strands of 
literature the ambition here is to develop a model that can explain changes in daycare spending in different 
political economies when FLFP rises. There will first be an introduction to the two strands of literature 
followed by an interpretation of how the conditional effects of FLFP on daycare spending. 
 One of the core insights in the Varieties of Capitalism theory is that the institutional underpinnings of 
the political economy influence the actor’s interest’s (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Mares, 2003; Martin & Swank, 
2012). We would, therefore, expect key actors to have different preferences for social policies in different 
market economies. The literature distinguishes between two broad forms of market capitalism: 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market economies (LMEs). Employers in CMEs are, in 
general, expected to have positive preferences for social policies. Firms in CMEs need an abundance of 
(high quality) specific skill assets in order to sustain a high-equilibrium production mode. As skill specificity 
is related to more labor market risks, social security is a prerequisite for workers investment in these skills 
(Iversen & Soskice, 2001. As such social policy can complement the high equilibrium production strategy in 
CMEs (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001; Iversen, 2005; Etzerodt & Eriksen, 2017). As a result, employers will be 
more positive toward social policy and investment high-quality human capital formation. The logic of 
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employer’s preferences for social policy is different in LMEs where employers, in general, are less inclined 
to support social policy and human capital investment. Since firms in LMEs to a larger extent depend on 
production with general skill assets relative to skill-specific assets, employers will be less motivated to 
support social policy. On the contrary to CMEs, firms in LMEs will either be motivated to sustain the status 
quo or to cut spending on social policy to sustain comparative advantage (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Etzerodt & 
Eriksen, 2017). 
 From the literature on constitutional structures, I take the core insight that constitutional systems with 
many veto points will tend to impede and obstruct the policy-making process (Immergut, 1992; Huber et 
al., 1993; Huber & Stephens, 2001). In Immergut’s (1992) seminal study, it is argued that the degree of 
centralization and insulation of power in the political system can explain differences in policy outcomes. In 
political systems where executive power is highly dispersed narrow interest can more easily veto policy 
proposals – i.e. block policy reforms. This is the case in presidential systems, bicameral systems and political 
systems with strong federalist governance structures. In political systems where power, to the contrary, is 
concentrated and where party discipline is the norm, policies will more likely be passed through the 
legislature. As Maioni (1992) moreover argues, parliamentary systems tend to foster strong party discipline 
which makes it harder for central actors to influence small minorities of the party (and hence veto a policy), 
as the whole party needs to be convinced. The constitutional structure of any given political economy is 
therefore expected to affect the policy-making process. As Huber & Stephens (2001: 46) formulates it: 
 
“those features of constitutions that make it difficult to research and implement decisions based on 
narrow majorities – and that conversely let minority interest obstruct legislation – will impede far-
reaching reforms in social policy”. 
 
Constitutional systems with many veto points will, in other words, tend to retard daycare spending and 
social policy development in general. 
 
A conditional model of female labor market integration and daycare spending 
 
The argument that working women have an effect on daycare spending can as such be interpreted as an 
argument of social mobilization. When women enter the labor market, they mobilize through the 
workplace and transforms the political arena by changing coalitional structures as well. However, if the 
mobilization of working women has to succeed in increasing spending on daycare institutions, it has to be 
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coupled with the interest of other key actors in the political system – as well as the modus operandi of the 
political system itself. 
If we combine the VoC model and the constitutional structure model with female labor market 
integration it is possible to develop a set of theoretical predictions and hypotheses. We start by introducing 
the expected interaction effects between working women and market economies and then elaborate on 
the role of the constitutional structure. 
 Even though firms in CMEs might statistically discriminate women and the skill structure may sustain sex 
segregation in the labor market (Estévez-Abe, 2005, Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2010), production in CMEs is, in 
the long run, still dependent on well-developed skills. As high-quality daycare institutions are important for 
the long-term functioning of an economy (Esping-Andersen, 2002) as well as for the development of less 
well of children to acquire skill assets (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002), investment in early childhood 
education is paramount for sustaining a high-equilibrium production mode. Investment in education at an 
early stage is therefore expected to be in the interest of employers in CMEs – in particular in the long run. 
That is not to say that single firms in CMEs will not oppose daycare reforms, but to say that in a knowledge 
economy quality production is highly dependent on investment in children at an early stage. Employers in 
CMEs should therefore, in general, be supportive of daycare spending. However, firms in LMEs will be 
inclined to keep cost down to secure profitability (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Knetter, 1989). As high welfare 
spending on daycare, all else equal, raises taxes which may weaken firm’s competitiveness (Bruce, 2000; 
Hilman, 2003), employers in LMEs will be more inclined to support the status quo or even push for cuts in 
daycare spending. Employers in LMEs will, therefore, in general, be less supportive of expanding daycare 
spending. 
 As investment in caregiving policies can be expected to complement the production mode in CMEs, the 
effects of FLFP will more likely result in more spending on daycare in CMEs, but not in LMEs where 
employers are opposed to increased spending. The following hypothesis can, therefore, be tested: 
 
H1: Female labor force participation will be positively correlated with daycare spending in CMEs, but not 
in LMEs. 
 
It is however not only actors to whom working women can ally with that matters for changes in daycare 
spending. The constitutional structure can also condition the effects of FLFP on daycare spending. The logic 
is rather straightforward. If the interest of working women is aligned with key actors – such as employer’s 
organizations – that is no certainty for getting legislation done as political systems with many veto points 
more easily can put an end to the policy-making process. A relatively easy and smooth road to accepting 
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new policies can, therefore, be a prerequisite if FLFP is to have a positive effect on daycare spending. One 
could, therefore, in general, expect the combination of political economies with few constitutional veto 
points and high FLFP to push more family-friendly policies through the legislature. The following hypothesis 
can, therefore, be tested: 
 
H2: Female labor force participation will be positively correlated with daycare spending in countries with 
few constitutional veto points, but not in countries with many constitutional veto points. 
 
Method and data 
 
The hypotheses are tested using a time-series cross-section framework containing 17 advanced capitalist 
countries from 1980-20071. There are unfortunately no valid spending data on caregiving and daycare 
spending available before 1980. The timeframe has therefore primarily been chosen due to the availability 
of data. 
 As the dependent variable, public expenditures on daycare/home-help services is used as a measure of 
daycare spending (Brady et al., 2014). Public expenditure on daycare services is measured as a percentage 
of GDP. The measure, therefore, captures some of the core aspects of spending on daycare institutions. We 
will, therefore, expect higher levels of FLFP to be positively correlated with spending on daycare.  
 The main explanatory variable is female labor force participation (FLFP). The FLFP rate is the percentage 
of the female working-age population in the labor market. The three other explanatory variables are left 
parties, employers’ organizations, and constitutional structures. Left parties measure the cumulative share 
of seats in the parliament held by leftist governments since 1946 (Brady et al., 2014). Different ways of 
operationalizing the partisan variable can, however, influence the empirics (Schmitt, 2016). A model with 
cabinet shares is there also used to test if the interaction between FLFP and left parties has an impact on 
daycare  (Huber & Stephens, 2001). Employer organization is a composite index including measures of the 
presence of national employers’ federation, the peak federation’s powers over members (i.e., appointment 
power, veto power over collective bargains and lockouts, own conflict funds), and policy-process 
integration of employers in (e.g., boards, commissions) (Martin & Swank, 2012b: 11). The variable is 
arguably the best proxy available for employers’ organization that relates most clearly to the theoretical 
argument put forward2. However, the data series ends in 2003 and has therefore been extrapolated until 
                                                          
1Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
2 That is not to say that it is a perfect measure as it is relatively time-invariant. There is, however, a lot of ground to cover when it 
comes to good measures for employers’ organizations (Jahn, 2016). 
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2007. This should provide no major bias, as most of the variance in the variable is between countries. 
Further analysis moreover indicates that it is the case3. As a robustness check, a model with Martin & 
Swank’s (2012) measure for macro corporatism has also been utilized. It yields similar results. 
Constitutional structure is a composite index including seven aspects of constitutional structures: degree of 
federalism, presence of presidentialism, proportional representation/single-member district, degree of 
bicameralism, referenda in national policy-making, judicial review, degree of authoritarianism (Huber et al., 
1993; Huber & Stephens, 2001). 
Furthermore, a number of standard control variables are included. First, real GDP per capita in 
constant prices is included. The effects of GDP on welfare measures (such as daycare spending) is 
debatable; although, the GDP measure is conventionally assumed to be positively correlated with 
spending measures (Wilensky, 2002). However, since daycare spending is measured as a percentage of 
GDP, an increase in GDP should be negatively correlated with daycare spending as the numerator 
increases relative to the denominator (if GDP goes up daycare spending will, all else equal, be declining) 
GDP is, therefore, an important control variable in the current set-up. 
Second, the unemployment rate is included to control for possible business cycle effects (Swank, 2002). 
If unemployment is high, it can also divert spending away from daycare to finance the unemployed 
temporarily. Unemployment is therefore expected to be negatively correlated with daycare spending. 
Third, the old-age dependency ratio (the population over 65 in percentages of the population size) 
(Armingeon et al., 2016) is included to control for is possible fiscal pressure on the welfare state (Pierson, 
2001; Etzerodt et al., 2017). A high old-age dependency ratio is therefore expected to be negatively 
correlated with daycare spending. 
 Fourth, debt is included as high levels of debt are expected to be negatively correlated with daycare 
spending as countries with high levels of financial constraint can be forced to cut welfare spending 
(Pierson, 2001b). Debt is measured as general government gross financial liabilities as a percentage of 
GDP (Brady et al., 2014). Since some observations are missing in the dataset, simple linear interpolation 
has been implemented to fill out the missing values. However, interpolating values can give biased 
estimators. The regression models are therefore run both with and without debt as a control variable. 
Fifth, “globalization” can also affect governments spending abilities. Globalization is operationalized 
as capital mobility – measuring capital account openness (inward and outward flows), which is an index 
ranging from 0 (no openness) to 100 (complete openness) – and trade openness defined as the sum of 
exports and imports as a percentage of GDP (Brady et al., 2014). The effects of globalization on welfare 
spending is highly debatable (Garrett, 1998; Iversen & Cusack, 2000; Jahn, 2006; Busemeyer, 2009), 
                                                          
3 A set of models using 1981-2004 data (remember that the variable is lagged by one year) yields near identical estimates. 
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however, capital mobility is in general expected to be negatively correlated with welfare spending 
(Frieden & Rogowski, 1996; Swank, 2002; Swank, 2010). Trade openness is however expected to be 
positively correlated with welfare spending (Cameron, 1978; Garett, 1998).  
Sixth, deindustrialization is also included as a control variable (Iversen & Cusack, 2000). 
Deindustrialization is measured as “100 minus the sum of agricultural and industry employment as a 
percentage of the working-age-population” (Iversen & Cusack, 2000). Deindustrialization is in general 
expected to result in a more welfare spending – and hence more spending on daycare. 
  as governments have to cushion the labor force against risks imposed by deindustrialization. 
 Seventh, the fertility rate is included to catch possible changes in the demography of small children. The 
fertility rate is measured as the average number of births per women (Brady et al., 2014). High fertility 
rates are expected to increase spending on daycare institutions as more children rise the demand for 
caregiving policies.  
Table 1. Main explanatory variables (mean values) 
 
 
Since I am interested in the dynamic relationship between FLFP and daycare spending, an error 
correction model (ECM) is utilized. An Im-Pasaran-Shin and Levin-Lin-Chu test for unit root (Im et al., 2003; 
Levin et al., 2002) moreover show that there are severe problems with unit roots in the level of daycare 
spending4. As the dependent variable is first-differenced in an error correction model bias stemming from 
                                                          
4 This is the case with and without a trend specification with a one-year lag. 
Country FLFP
Employer 
organization
Constitutional 
Structure Left parties
Australia 61,16 0,15 4,00 15,58
Austria 61,72 0,22 1,00 29,27
Belgium 50,74 0,22 2,07 15,95
Canada 67,34 -1,96 5,00 0,00
Denmark 74,56 0,99 0,00 28,40
Finland 71,70 0,77 0,00 20,15
France 59,11 0,12 2,68 11,92
Germany 59,27 -0,06 4,00 13,83
Ireland 47,37 -0,03 0,00 4,73
Italy 44,04 0,05 1,43 6,13
Netherlands 55,47 0,10 1,00 11,06
New Zealand 65,34 -0,19 1,14 15,85
Norway 71,73 0,95 0,00 35,85
Sweden 78,28 0,21 0,00 39,76
Switzerland 70,72 -0,06 6,00 11,13
United Kingdom 66,18 -0,21 2,00 18,89
United States 67,46 -1,96 7,00 0,00
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unit roots is therefore eliminated. Using an error correction specification is therefore also supported by the 
data structure, as using the level of daycare spending would result in severe biases. 
ECMs furthermore have several advantages. First, the specification incorporates short-term (i.e. yearly 
changes) as well as long-term (i.e. level changes) effects of covariates on the dependent variable (Beck & 
Katz 1996, 2011; Iversen & Cusack, 2000). This makes it possible not only to distinguish between 
differences in time effects from the independent variables, but it also allows one to include almost time-
invariant variables (e.g. constitutional structures) and slightly changing variables (e.g. employer’s 
organizations) in the model. This is highly relevant in comparative political economy where a good portion 
of the variables is relatively time-invariant. Second, the model estimates the dynamic changes in daycare 
spending, which is of particular interest here. As the dependent variable is first-differenced it is possible to 
investigate what happens with the yearly changes in our measures for family and caregiving policies as the 
level and the first-difference of our explanatory variable changes. Third, some scholars argue that ECMs 
yield more reliable estimates than static level models (De Boef & Keele, 2008). This is even argued to be 
true in the presence of nonstationary processes (Podestá, 2006). 
I furthermore prefer running the models with year fixed effects5 (to control for common shocks) instead 
of country fixed effects, as country fixed effects remove the variance between countries. As Plümper et al. 
(2005: 331) clearly put it: “Country dummies control away the deviation of the variables’ mean of one unit 
from the variables’ mean of the base unit. Thus, unit dummies completely absorb differences in the level of 
independent variables across units”. Given that I am interested in how differences in employers’ 
organizations, constitutional structures, and left parties mediate the effects of FLFP on daycare spending, 
running a model with country fixed effects would eliminate the variance of interest (i.e. the difference 
between countries) (see also Beck, 2008). Using country fixed effects would, therefore, result in bias as the 
theorized relationship would be eliminated. As such, I refrain from using country fixed effects and instead 
run the models with year fixed effects. 
To correct for problems with serial correlation in the error terms all models are, furthermore, regressed 
with panel corrected standard errors (Beck & Katz, 1995) as well as Prais-Winsten estimates. 
 The model to be estimated can, therefore, be written as follows: 
 
Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽
𝑗𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑗
𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽Δ
𝑗
Δ𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑗
𝑗 + 𝜖𝑡,      
 
                                                          
5  A F-test moreover suggest the validity of including year dummies. 
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where 𝑦 denotes the dependent variable (daycare spending) and 𝑥 the independent variables. The 
subscript 𝑖 refers to a particular country and subscript t to a particular year, superscript j denotes a 
particular independent variable while e is the error term. Δ signifies the first difference of a variable (and 
hence the short-term effects). The long-term effects are given by 𝛽𝑗/𝛽1. All explanatory variables are 
furthermore lagged by one year (as shown by the t-1), as one can expect a time lag on the effects of the 
independent variables. 
 
Empirical findings 
 
The results of the empirical tests are shown in table 2. As indicated in model I, FLFP seems to have a 
positive effect daycare spending, as indicated by the positive correlation between the FLFP level variable 
and changes in daycare spending. Recall that the long-term effects are given by 0,00154/0,0335. Countries 
where more women are integrated into the labor market, therefore, tend to increase spending on daycare. 
But how what are the conditional effects of FLFP on daycare spending? 
The test of the Huber & Stephens (2001) hypothesis – that the interaction between left parties and FLFP 
will result in more daycare spending – is shown in model II in table 2. As indicated by the insignificant 
interaction terms – both the short-run and the long-run interaction term – the relative power of left parties 
does not mediate the effects of FLFP on daycare spending. To test if the insignificant interaction term is a 
result of the measure of the left party variable, a measure with cabinet shares instead of cumulative seats 
have been utilized (not shown). Using cabinet shares instead of the share of left seats in government still 
yields insignificant values, which solidifies the initial finding. There is, therefore, no apparent association 
between the interaction between FLFP and the partisan variable – and hence no support for Huber & 
Stephen’s (2001) hypothesis. 
This is not to say that Huber & Stephens (2001) empirical analysis is not valid as they test their model on 
data covering the expansion of the welfare state (1960-1985). They moreover use a static level model, 
which is likely to yield different results. More importantly, they do not test their model directly on daycare 
spending. However, the data presented here suggest that their model is not capable of explaining changes 
in daycare spending in the period after the welfare state has matured (from the 1980s and onwards).  
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Table 2. Prais-Winsten estimates of the conditional effects of female labor force participation on daycare 
spending, 1980-2007. 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
I II III IV
∆Daycare 
Spending
∆Daycare 
Spending
∆Daycare 
Spending
∆Daycare 
Spending
Lagged dependent (level) -0.0335
*
-0.0401
**
-0.0350
** -0.0300
(0.0187) (0.0191) (0.0178) (0.0206)
Total fertility rate 0.0169 0.0121 0.0245 0.0109
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0154) (0.0161)
∆.Total fertility rate 0.0700 0.0426 0.0527 0.0943
(0.0788) (0.0785) (0.0795) (0.0802)
Left parties -0.00176
**
-0.00189
**
-0.00212
*** -0.00264
(0.000812) (0.000825) (0.000817) (0.00355)
∆Left parties 0.00772 0.00993 0.00881 0.0184
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0120)
65+ 0.00561
*
0.00690
**
0.00684
** 0.00519
*
(0.00299) (0.00313) (0.00332) (0.00315)
∆65+ 0.0155 0.00723 0.0161 0.0168
(0.0298) (0.0300) (0.0290) (0.0293)
Unemployment -0.00452
**
-0.00555
**
-0.00438
** -0.00393
*
(0.00225) (0.00238) (0.00219) (0.00218)
∆Unemployment 0.00197 0.00240 0.000973 0.00149
(0.00504) (0.00501) (0.00499) (0.00499)
Capital mobility -0.000252 -0.000521 -0.000623
* -0.000387
(0.000296) (0.000329) (0.000318) (0.000292)
∆Capital mobility -0.000354 -0.000152 0.000000245 -0.000224
(0.000889) (0.000877) (0.000880) (0.000875)
rGDPc -0.00000119 -0.00000165
* -0.000000516 -0.000000682
(0.000000817) (0.000000877) (0.000000679) (0.000000743)
∆rGDPc 0.00000554 0.00000768 0.00000238 0.00000374
(0.00000699) (0.00000696) (0.00000689) (0.00000678)
Trade openness -0.00000300 0.0000481 0.000116 0.0000482
(0.0000815) (0.0000834) (0.0000776) (0.0000905)
∆Trade openness -0.000618 -0.000707 -0.000354 -0.000679
(0.000924) (0.000916) (0.000924) (0.000935)
Deindustrialization 0.00349
*
0.00421
* 0.00205 0.00244
(0.00211) (0.00215) (0.00169) (0.00177)
∆Deindustrialization -0.00162 -0.000570 -0.000828 -0.00144
(0.00268) (0.00265) (0.00265) (0.00270)
FLFP 0.00154
***
0.00142
***
0.00225
*** 0.00102
*
(0.000524) (0.000518) (0.000666) (0.000572)
∆FLFP 0.000785 0.0000432 0.00131 -0.000716
(0.00374) (0.00371) (0.00387) (0.00435)
Constitutional structure -0.00704
***
-0.00684
***
0.0335
** -0.00772
***
(0.00246) (0.00244) (0.0143) (0.00273)
∆Constitutional structure __ __ __ -0.00568
(0.0233)
Employer organization 0.0119 -0.131
** __ __
(0.00788) (0.0563)
∆Employer organization 0.139
* 0.0787 __ __
(0.0731) (0.0700)
∆Left parties*∆FLFP __ 0.00859 __ __
(0.0110)
Left parties*FLFP __ 0.0000154 __ __
(0.0000560)
∆Employer organization*FLFP __ __ -0.127 __
(0.0980)
Employer organization*FLFP __ __ 0.00211** __
(0.000841)
∆Constitutional structure*FLFP __ __ __ 0.00285
(0.0181)
Constitutional structure*FLFP __ __ __ -0.000646***
(0.000228)
Constant -0.312
* -0.202 -0.333
*
-0.278
*
(0.178) (0.148) (0.179) (0.152)
N 476 476 476 476
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.286 0.281 0.297 0.282
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Turning towards the interaction effects between FLFP and employers’ organizations, the (level) 
interaction term between the two variables are significant at the 0,05 level (see model III in table 2). It is, 
however, important to show the marginal effects with a confidence interval, as calculating the effects by 
hand fails to tell under what conditions the marginal effects are different from zero (Brambor et al., 2006). 
The marginal effects are depicted in figure 1. As shown in figure 1 the marginal effects of FLFP are positively 
correlated with daycare spending, but only in CMEs – i.e. countries with strong employers’ organizations – 
such as Denmark and Norway (but also continental European countries such as Austria and Belgium). The 
marginal effects moreover tend to be positively correlated with daycare spending in LMEs – i.e. countries 
with the absence of strong employer organizations such as USA and Canada – but these effects are not 
different from zero (as indicated by the confidence interval). These empirical findings therefore strongly 
indicate that employers’ organizations condition the effects of FLFP on daycare spending in the long run: 
FLFP will have a positive effect on daycare spending, but only in countries with strong employer 
organizations. 
 
Figure 1. Marginal effects of female labor force participation on daycare spending, given various levels of 
employer organization. 
 
Moving on to how constitutional structures condition the effects of FLFP, a set of models with an 
interaction term between FLFP and constitutional structures are moreover included in table 2. First, the 
(level) interaction term between FLFP and constitutional structures is highly significant at the 0,01 level, 
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indicating long-term effects from the interaction (see model IV). The marginal effects of FLFP are, 
moreover, positively correlated with daycare spending, but only in countries with few constitutional veto 
points (the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Ireland and Britain). The marginal effects on daycare spending 
are not different from zero in countries with many veto points (USA, Switzerland, Australia Canada and 
Germany). As hypothesized, FLFP will tend to be positively correlated with daycare spending in countries 
with few constitutional constraints. High levels of FLFP therefore seem to increase spending on daycare 
care, but only in countries with few constitutional veto points.  
 
Figure 2. Marginal effects of female labor force participation on daycare spending, given various levels of 
veto points (constitutional structure). 
 
The control variables moreover, in general, comply the expected predictions. The fertility rate is 
positively, but insignificantly correlated with daycare spending. The left party variable is somewhat 
surprisingly negatively correlated with daycare in most of the models. If one, however, runs a model with 
cabinet shares instead of cumulative seats, the left party variable becomes insignificant in most models 
(not shown). The (level) of old-age dependency (people over 65) is positively and significantly correlated 
with daycare spending. Unemployment is significantly and negatively correlated with daycare. Capital 
mobility and trade openness are in general negatively, but insignificant correlated with daycare spending. 
The level of GDP is as expected in general negatively correlated with daycare spending, although it is often 
insignificant. The effects of deindustrialization are somewhat inconclusive. The linear effects of the 
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constitutional structure are as expected negatively correlated with daycare. The linear effects of employer’s 
organizations moreover tend to be positively associated with the family policy measures. 
 
Discussion 
 
The hypothesized relationship between of FLFP and daycare spending, therefore, seems to be 
substantiated by the empirics. In political economies with both organized employer organizations and few 
constitutional constraints, the effects of female labor market integration will, therefore, tend to result in 
high levels of daycare spending (see the bottom right corner in figure 3). Countries with both fragmented 
employers’ organizations and many constitutional constraints will, however, tend to impede the effects of 
FLFP and will, therefore, in general, result in low levels of daycare spending (see the top left corner of figure 
3). Countries with either fragmented employers’ organizations or many constitutional constraints will tend 
to obtain relative medium levels of daycare spending. 
 
Figure 3. The effects of female labor force participation on daycare spending given the structure of 
employers’ organizations and the presence of constitutional constraints. 
 
 
These findings go some way in explaining why spending on daycare varies amongst advanced capitalist 
countries. As the northern European countries – such as Denmark and Sweden – in general, have high 
levels of FLFP, organized employers (although Swedish employers have become more fragmented in the 
1990s and 2000s) and few institutional constraints, it is then no surprise that they then also, in general, 
spend relatively more on daycare. At the other end of the scale, the USA and Canada have experienced a 
substantial increase in FLFP over the period. The increase in FLFP has, however, not resulted in substantially 
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higher spending on daycare as the political system with relatively many veto points and the fragmented 
nature of the political economy have blocked initiatives to increase spending on daycare. 
The institutional underpinnings of most northern European countries, therefore, seem to support 
human capital formation at an early stage, which is both crucial for economic efficiency and social equality 
in the long run. Economically high investment in early childhood education can be crucial for sustaining a 
high-equilibrium production mode over the long run – for example in knowledge-intensive markets such as 
clean energy and nanotechnology – which is essential for firms’ comparative advantages in CMEs.  The 
combination of high female labor market integration, strong and well-organized employers’ organizations 
and a political system with few constitutional constraints (among possible other factors) therefore seem to 
strengthen the comparative advantages of northern European CMS vis á vis southern European CMEs and 
LMEs. Socially, this combination of actors and institutions can also strengthen social solidarity. As argued by 
Heckmann (2006) and others, investment in early childhood education yields high returns in the long run. 
Chances of children born in well-off homes to become well integrated into to society are much greater 
when governments invest heavily in human capital formation and general well-being of kids at an early 
stage. The analysis has, as such, also implications for social solidarity and inequality in general. Securing 
high investment in children is certainly an important prerequisite for a well-functioning capitalist system in 
the knowledge economy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What effects does female labor market integration have on changes in daycare spending? In this article, it is 
argued that high levels of employment amongst women substantially raises the demand for daycare 
spending forcing governments to raise spending on daycare. The effects of female labor force participation 
(FLFP) are, however, not linear amongst all advanced capitalist countries. In the article, it is argued contrary 
to prior research highlighting interaction effects between FLFP and left parties, that left parties do not 
mediate the effects of FLFP on changes in daycare spending. Instead, it is argued that employer 
organizations and constitutional structures condition the effects of FLFP. FLFP only seems to result in higher 
spending on daycare spending in countries with strong employer organizations and political systems with 
few constitutional constraints. If FLFP is to result in more daycare spending, it is therefore important that 
working women’s interest are aligned with the interest of employers’ organizations as well as a political 
system where it is relatively easy to push new policy through the legislature. However, in political 
economies with fragmented and week employers’ organizations and many constitutional constraints there 
tend to be no effects of FLFP on daycare spending. As such, the organization of the political economy and 
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the constitutional structure are important in understanding the conditional effects of FLFP on daycare 
spending. 
 Securing investment in early capital formation – i.e. investment in early childhood development – is 
furthermore argued to be a prerequisite for a well-functioning market economy. This is particularly the case 
in the northern European economies where the production mode is highly dependent on high-quality skill 
assets. However, high investment in early childhood development can also support social solidarity, as high 
levels of daycare spending increase less well-off children’s chances of success in their adult life. High levels 
of daycare spending can, therefore, secure the combined objective of high economic performance and 
social equality in the long run. 
 At a theoretical level, the article tries to develop a new way of thinking about changes in daycare 
spending that links female labor market integration, Varieties of Capitalism and constitutional structures 
into one model. As such, I have tried to show the benefits of marrying these strands of literature in 
explaining daycare spending across advanced capitalist countries. Whether the model can explain broader 
welfare state changes is for future research to decide. 
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